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ABSTRACT 
Using a model of market making with inventories based on Biais (1993), we find 
that investors obtain more favorable execution prices, and they hence invest more, 
when markets are fragmented. In our model, risk-averse dealers use less aggres-
sive price strategies in more transparent markets (centralized) because quote dis-
semination alleviates uncertainty about the prices quoted by other dealers and, 
hence, reduces the need to compete aggressively for order flow. Further, we show 
that the move toward greater transparency (centralization) may have detrimental 
effects on liquidity and welfare. 
STOCK EXCHANGES EVERYWHERE ARE ENGAGED in a contest for economies of scale 
and scope. In May 2000, the London Stock Exchange and the Deutsche Bourse 
announced a merger, along with a joint venture with America's Nasdaq, an 
agreement that eventually came apart. One of the main obstacles to the 
merger had been a lack of consensus on trading-system design and regulation. 
In the design of securities-trading systems, the question of transparency 
has become a major issue. Regulators disagree among themselves about the 
desired level of transparency in stock exchange dealings. In the United States, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) view is straightforward: 
"The Commission has long believed that transparency-the real time, public 
dissemination of trade and quotation information-plays a fundamental role 
in the fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets . . . transparency 
helps to link dispersed markets and improves the price discovery, fairness, 
competitiveness and attractiveness of U.S. markets" (Securities and Ex-
change Commission (1995a), Chapter IV-I). In the same vein, the SEC also 
argued" ... transparent disclosure of quotes and trades promotes best ex-
ecution" (Securities and Exchange Commission (1995b), p. 2). In contrast, in 
the United Kingdom, the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) has argued 
that there are important differences between quotation transparency and 
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2trade transparency, and that transparency (in the context of prompt publi-
cation of large trades) should be restricted if it is necessary to assure ade-
quate liquidity.! 
Transparency has two different dimensions. Pretrade transparency refers 
to the wide dissemination of price quotations and orders before the trade, 
whereas posttrade transparency refers to the public and timely transmission 
of information on past trades, including execution time, volume, and price. 
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with pretrade transparency in the 
form of price-quotation dissemination. Using a model of market making with 
inventories,2 we address the effects of pretrade transparency by comparing 
centralized and fragmented markets. These two kinds of market structures 
differ in the amount of information on price quotations that is available to 
dealers. In centralized markets, bid and ask prices are public. Thus, dealers 
can observe the quotes of their competitors. In fragmented markets, deals 
are often the outcome of bilateral transactions negotiated on the phone, at 
prices within the screen quotations. Dealers can then only hypothesize on 
the probability that their quotations are more attractive than those of their 
competitors. Examples of centralized markets are stock and futures ex-
changes, markets such as the Paris Bourse, or CBOT. Telephone-mediated 
dealer markets and the Treasury bond markets are fragmented. 
Our main result is that transparency may not enhance market competi-
tiveness. The key to understanding this surprising result is to see that mar-
ket makers have a strong interest in being able to forecast their transactions, 
because good forecasts will lower carrying costs. Quotation visibility simpli-
fies the dealers' task of obtaining their planned order flow, because it pro-
vides dealers with information that enables them to outbid competitors by 
small margins when they need more orders. If quotation visibility is lacking, 
dealers are uncertain about the bid required to obtain an order, and this 
causes them to bid more aggressively when more orders are needed. For this 
reason, in our model, investors obtain more favorable execution prices when 
markets are fragmented. 
Auction theory is useful for analyzing this process. The desire to reduce 
inventory carrying costs causes market makers to behave as risk-averse bid-
ders for the business of the investing public, with their price offers playing 
the role of the bids in an auction. In a transparent securities market, the 
market makers are, in effect, participating in a multiple-round open-bid (En-
glish) auction, in which each market maker always has the opportunity of 
surpassing the bids of competing market makers. In a fragmented market, 
the market makers are participating in a sealed-bid auction, with the in-
vestor opening the envelopes and choosing the winner. 
1 For further discussions on these issues, see Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999). 
2 In this setting, the market spread reflects the inventory costs dealers face in providing 
liquidity services. Empirical research that supports inventory models in dealer markets include 
Fleming and Remolona (1999) for the U.S. Treasury Market and Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan 
(1998) for the London Stock Exchange. 
3In a multiple-round open-bid auction, the bidder's dominant strategy is to 
continue to improve his bids either until his competitors drop out, or until 
the bidding of his competitors reduces his own net value of winning to zero. 
Risk aversion can have no effect on this strategy, because the bidder makes 
the decision to stop bidding with full information. However, risk aversion 
does have an impact on bidding strategies in a sealed-bid auction. More 
aggressive bids increase the probability of winning and decrease the size of 
the profits earned by winning: Precisely what a risk-averse bidder wants to 
do. This is the reason why with risk-averse bidders who have certain knowl-
edge of their private value of winning, a sealed-bid auction can be expected 
to earn more for the auctioneer than a multiple-round open-bid auction. So 
it is with fragmented and centralized securities markets: The former earns 
more for the investor. 
Since the public will learn to expect better execution prices in fragmented 
markets, the optimal market order will be larger in these markets. The im-
plication for the optimal design of financial markets is clear: Liquidity may 
be enhanced when markets are less transparent. More importantly, quota-
tion transparency need not be beneficial either for investors or for dealers. 
Investors' orders are executed at better prices in fragmented markets. Deal-
ers in fragmented markets face more competition and tighter margins, but 
they can also enjoy lower inventory carrying costs. This welfare implication 
represents a departure from the standard theoretical models that omit in-
ventory costs altogether, and helps explain why dealers have been among 
the most active participants in transparency discussions (see Gemmill (1996)). 
These welfare results have the same flavor as the results from laboratory 
experiments reported in Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999). 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section I presents the model. In 
Section Il, reservation quotes and optimal quotes are examined. Section III 
is devoted to the benchmark case in which the market order is determined 
exogenously. In Section IV, the market order of the public is determined 
endogenously. Section V discusses the robustness of the results. Section VI 
outlines the policy implications of our findings and concludes. Finally, all the 
proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
I. The Model 
The model is based on the dealer market model of Biais (1993). A risky 
asset is traded against a riskless asset whose payoff is normalized to one. 
There are two types of market participants: (a) those who demand liquidity 
and Cb) those who supply liquidity. Liquidity is demanded by outside risk-
averse investors who are affected by liquidity shocks. From now on, we 
refer to the representative investor as the public. Liquidity is supplied 
by risk-averse agents, who set prices at which they will buy or sell any 
quantity of the risky asset. We refer to them as market makers or dealers, 
indistinctly. 
4All the market participants, the dealers, and the public, will have CARA 
utility functions in their terminal wealth, with a common risk aversion co-
efficient R, that is, 
U(W) = -e -RW. (1) 
Trade occurs according to the following sequence of events. 
A. Stage 1: Determination of N 
Initially, there is a population of potential liquidity suppliers, indexed by i. 
N out of these agents decide to become liquidity suppliers, at a fixed cost C. 
B. Stage 2: Endowments 
Agent i is endowed with cash, Ti , and with a random inventory position of 
the risky asset, I i . We assume that inventories are independently and iden-
tically distributed. The cumulative distribution function of I i , F(.), is de-
fined on [-M, M).3 It is assumed that F is differentiable with probability 
distribution function f(·). 
Throughout the paper, we will use order statistics. Those associated with 
a sample of N random inventory draws from F(·) will be denoted by 
(I/)j=l, ... ,N' Thus, IN denotes the maximum out of N random inventory 
draws, IN- 1 refers to the second largest inventory draw, and so on. Similarly, 
the order statistics associated with a sample of N - 1 draws will be denoted 
by OJ)j=l, ... ,N-l' 
C. Stage 3: The Market Order 
With probability A, a liquidity shock occurs. If it occurs, then the public is, 
equally likely, endowed with either a long position, + L, or a short position, 
- L, of the risky asset. At this stage, the public decides whether to buy or to 
sell, and the size of her market order, denoted by Q. 
To ensure trading between the public and the dealers, it is assumed that 
their inventory positions are sufficiently different to generate trade. This 
fact is reflected in the following hypothesis: L > M. 4 
D. Stage 4: Trading 
Agent i supplies liquidity to the public by posting a selling and a buying 
price, denoted by Ai and Bi , respectively. Since all market participants have 
homogeneous expectations about the final value of the risky security, Ai and 
3 The limitations imposed on the dealers' ability to take long and short positions are consis-
tent with the observed limitations resulting from capital requirements or from administrative 
rules. 
4 It is important to point out that in this model there is no interdealer trading. We assume 
that inventory divergences among dealers are not large enough to generate profitable trades 
between them. 
5Bi can be expressed as Ai = E(P)(l + a;) and Bi = E(P)(l - b;), where E(P) 
represents the expected final value of the risky asset and a i (b;) represents 
the selling (buying) premium of dealer i. For simplicity, E(P) is normalized 
to one. 
Dealers' price strategies are functions of their inventory positions. Since 
we will focus on symmetric equilibria, the selling and buying premia of dealer i 
are ai = a(li) and bi = b(l;). These premia must satisfy the following con-
dition: Given that i's competitors use the price strategies a(·) and b(·), dealer i 
maximizes his expected utility by choosing a(J;) and b(J;) as his selling and 
buying premia. 
E. Stage 5: The Final Value of the Asset 
The final value of the risky asset, P (P = 1 + z, where Z is normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance (}'2), is realized. 
Finally, the dealers' inventory positions, the liquidity shock and the final 
value of the risky asset are assumed independent random variables. The 
joint distribution of all these random variables will be common knowledge. 
Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events in the trading process.5 
11. Reservation Quotes and Optimal Quotes 
A. Reservation Quotes 
Reservation quotes are such that dealers are indifferent between trading 
once at these prices and not trading. Thus, market maker i chooses his res-
ervation prices so that the expected utility of his terminal wealth from trad-
ing at those prices (i.e., from selling at an ask price 1 + a r i or from buying 
at a bid price 1 - b,,;) is equal to that if he did not trade at all. Bearing this 
condition in mind, the first lemma characterizes the reservation quotes. 
LEMMA 1: (Ho and Stall (1983)). The reservation selling and buying prices of 
dealer i are 1 + ar,i and 1 - br,i' where 
R(}'2 
ad = ar(l;) = -- (Q - 21;), and 
, 2 (2a) 
(2b) 
5 The trading game is a sequential game of incomplete information. We hence search for the 
standard equilibrium concept for these types of games, that is, a perfect Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium. 
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Figure 1. The trading game of agent i. The agent first decides whether to enter the market 
or not. He then receives his endowment of the risky asset, I i . If the public is not affected by a 
liquidity shock, there is no trade. If there is a liquidity shock, dealer i serves the market order 
to buy (sell) if his inventory is larger (smaller) than those of his competitors. 
A reservation fee represents the cost to a dealer of participating in a trans-
action that makes his overall portfolio nonoptimal and/or moves him to a 
less desirable level of risk.6 Notice that a r (b r ) is decreasing (increasing) in 
the inventory position. Thus, the larger a dealer's inventory position, the 
greater (smaller) his willingness to sell (buy). 
B. Optimal Quotes 
B.1. The Centralized Market 
Centralized markets were first studied in Ho and Stoll (1983). As they 
mention, one can view the process of setting bid-ask quotes in a centralized 
market as a progressive auction (an English auction) in which all dealers 
(except one) raise bid prices and lower ask prices to their reservation levels 
and thereby reveal their reservation prices. Notice that Bertrand com-
petition among dealers makes the agent who can offer the most attractive 
price undercut all his competitors. In particular, the optimal ask price, 
6 Note that reservation fees may be negative if the inventory position makes certain trans-
actions desirable. 
7AC = 1 + a~, will be the second-lowest reservation selling price. Similarly, 
the optimal bid price, BC = 1 - b;, will be the second-highest reservation 
buying price. Lemma 1 implies that 
R(J"2 
a~ = -2- (Q - 2IN-1 ) and (3a) 
(3b) 
Remark: In centralized markets, the optimal prices will be the second-
best reservation prices, no matter the dealers' attitude toward risk. Never-
theless, the optimal prices do depend on the risk attitudes as reservation 
prices depend upon them. 
B.2. The Fragmented Market 
In a fragmented market, dealer i does not know the quotes of his compet-
itors when he posts his quotes. One can hence view a fragmented market as 
a market functioning as a first price auction. A dealer will choose the quotes 
that maximize his expected utility assuming that his competitors follow ask 
and bid strategies that are strictly decreasing functions of their inventory 
positions. This expectation will be satisfied in equilibrium and it is, hence, 
rational. 
To compute dealer i's expected utility, let us introduce the following nota-
tion: Let IIa i denote the probability that dealer i's ask price is lower than 
his competitors' ask price. Since a(.) is a strictly decreasing function, 
(4) 
Similarly, let lIb i denote the probability that dealer i's bid price, 1 - b i , is 
higher than his ~ompetitors' bid price, or, equivalently, P(b i < Minj*i b(I)). 
Since b (.) is assumed a strictly increasing function, 
(5) 
By the symmetry of the analysis, we only develop the one corresponding to 
the ask price. Dealer i chooses a i to maximize the expected utility of his 
terminal wealth, that is, ifhe sets the lowest ask price (an event that occurs 
with probability IIa J, then he trades with the public by selling Q at his ask 
price. Otherwise, h~ does not trade. His expected utility will hence be 
(6) 
8where Wi(O) is dealer i's final wealth if he does not trade with the public, 
that is, 
Wi(O) = Ti - C + 1i(1 + z), (7) 
and W;(aJ represents dealer i's final wealth if he sells the quantity Q at the 
price 1 + ai' that is, 
Wi(a) = Ti - C + 1i(1 + z) + Q(a - z). (8) 
Using the definition of reservation quotes,7 we obtain 
(9) 
Since E(U(Wi (0» 11J is a negative constant with respect to ai' dealer i's max-
imization problem can be rewritten as 
Max ITa i [1 - e -RQ(a,-ar,i l ]. (10) 
a i 
Analogously, dealer i chooses b i to maximize ITb i [1 - e -RQ(b,-br ,,)]. 
The solutions to these problems characterize the optimal quotes in a frag-
mented market. 
PROPOSITION 1: Dealer i's optimal ask and bid prices are, respectively, 1 + ai 
and 1 - bi' where 
Dealer i's optimal quotes are strictly decreasing in his inventory position. 
Further, the surplus from trade, ai - a r i or bi - br i' is decreasing in N, and 
goes to zero as N goes to infinity.' , 
7 Notice that both E(U(Wi (a,))II,) and E(U(Wi(O)) 11,) are exponential functions because Wi(a,) 
and W,(O) are normally distributed once dealers know their inventory and the utility function 
is CARA. 
9To better assess the role of the dealers' attitude toward risk in fragmented 
markets, let us now compare the optimal quotes under risk aversion, A and B, 
with those obtained by Biais (1993), AB and BB. 
COROLLARY 1: The best ask (bid) quote satisfies A(I1.) < AB (11.), (B(In > 
BB(/n), where 
A(/1.) = 1 +RlT2[~ - R2~2Q In(E[eR2(T2QYN-1IYN_1 <11.])], (12a) 
AB(/1.) = 1 +RlT2[~ -E[YN-1IYN- 1 <11.]], (12b) 
B(In = 1 - RlT2 [~ - R2~2Q In(E[e-R2(T2QYlIYl > I{])J, and (12c) 
(12d) 
In Biais (1993), dealers have linear preferences over the surplus from trade. 
So, dealer i sets his ask price to solve MaxaiIIa,i[RQ(ai - ar,J]. They hence 
behave as risk-neutral agents who mark up their selling prices in order to 
increase the expected surplus from trade.8 In contrast, for risk-averse agents 
marking up becomes less attractive as the marginal increment in utility 
associated with trading at a slightly higher ask price weighs less heavily 
than the possible loss from not trading due to such a high price. Thus, risk 
aversion makes dealers set prices closer to their reservation fees than under 
risk neutrality: It decreases the optimal ask quote and increases the optimal 
bid quote. 
Ill. Exogenous Public Trade 
As a benchmark, we first analyze the trading game under the proviso that 
the quantity traded by the public is fixed. More precisely, we now assume 
that if the liquidity shock occurs, then the public is equally likely to buy or 
sell the quantity Q. Notice that the public is now a passive agent, she does 
not take any decision. Our aim here is twofold: (a) on one hand, to perform 
a welfare comparison between the two market structures, ceteris paribus, 
and, (b) on the other hand, to study the entry stage in this simpler setting. 
Dealers will prefer the market structure in which they can enjoy the larg-
est expected utility. We now show that they set their optimal premia in a 
fragmented market equal to the certainty equivalent for the premia they 
would receive in a centralized market. To see this, consider the optimal ask 
8 Note that Biais' dealers have reservation fees equal to those of risk-averse dealers (i.e., 
a r .,), whereas "pure" risk-neutral dealers have zero reservation fees. 
10
price. In a fragmented market, dealer i's maximization problem (see equa-
tion (A5) in the Appendix) implies that his selling premium satisfies 
e L' e-RQar(l)dFN-l(I) 
e-RQai = -M =E[e-RQar(YN--l)IY <I.] (13) FN-1(/J N-l ,. 
By multiplying both sides by -eRQar,i, we have 
(14) 
The left-hand side represents the utility of a dealer with inventory li when 
he trades with the public at an ask price 1 + ai and gets a final wealth equal 
to the surplus from trade, that is, Q(a i - ar(IJ). The right-hand side rep-
resents the expected utility from trade of a dealer with inventory li when he 
has the largest inventory (and, hence, the smallest reservation price) and 
receives a price equal to the smallest reservation price among his competi-
tors. Hence, ai is the certainty equivalent for the premium a dealer with 
inventory li would receive in a centralized market when winning.9 
PROPOSITION 2: Dealers are indifferent between the two market structures, 
ceteris paribus. 
It is important to emphasize that dealers would also be indifferent be-
tween the two markets if they were risk neutral. Nevertheless, this indif-
ference is due to the fact that risk-neutral dealers use price strategies that 
result in the same expected prices for the two markets. Under risk aversion, 
this is no longer the case, as dealers in fragmented markets bid more ag-
gressively relative to the centralized market because they have utility rea-
sons for wanting to unload excess inventory. 
From the public's perspective, her order is an investment in a risky asset. 
Since her wealth will depend upon the best quotes posted in the two mar-
kets, a risk-averse public will care about the distributions of these prices. 
Next, Proposition 3 shows that prices set in fragmented markets are more 
attractive to the public than those posted in centralized markets. 
PROPOSITION 3: Prices in fragmented markets dominate prices in centralized 
markets in the sense of second-degree stochastic monotonic dominance 
(SDSMD).lo 
9 Results in this subsection are consistent with results in the auction literature. In partic-
ular, Matthews (1987) has shown that a bidder with CARA utility bids in a first-price auction 
the certainty equivalent for the price he would pay in a second-price auction when winning. 
Waehrer, Harstad, and Rothkopf (1998) have shown that a second-price auction results in risk-
ier prices than a first-price auction. 
10 For any two random variables, x and y, x displays SDSMD over y if all risk-averse and 
nonsatiable individuals prefer x to y. Notice that SDSMD is weaker than second-degree sto-
chastic dominance as the latter requires that all risk-averse individuals prefer x to y (see Chap-
ter 2 in Huang and Litzenberger (1988)). 
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The characterization of SDSMD implies that fragmented markets lead to 
smaller (larger) expected selling (buying) prices than centralized markets; 
consequently, to smaller expected spreads. However, prices in fragmented 
markets are less risky than in centralized markets. Prior to trade, and con-
ditional on the dealers' information, the ask price is fixed in fragmented 
markets but random in a centralized market (it depends on the ask prices 
set by the nonwinning dealers). These two facts make the public strictly 
prefer fragmented markets. 
To summarize, fragmented markets are, ceteris paribus, more efficient 
(Pareto dominate) than centralized markets: Dealers are indifferent among 
the two market designs whereas the public strictly prefers fragmented 
markets. 
Dealers' indifference across markets ensures that, ceteris paribus, the equi-
librium number of dealers in the two markets will coincide. We now analyze 
the existence of such an equilibrium by studying the entry stage. 
At Stage 1, if agent i does not enter the market, he forgoes the possibility 
of trading, but he saves the entry cost. His expected utility will be 
E[U(Wi(O))e-RCl If he enters the market and receives inventory I i , he can 
face three possible spots (see Figure 1): 
1. His inventory is larger than the largest inventory among his compet-
itors. In this case, he will sell at ask if the public buys and he will not 
trade in any other case. 
2. His inventory is smaller than the smallest inventory among his com-
petitors. Then, he will buy at bid if the public sells and he will not 
trade in any other case. 
3. His inventory lies between the smallest and the largest inventory po-
sitions among his competitors. In this case, he will not trade. 
Consequently, his ex ante (before inventory positions are drawn) expected 
utility will be I~ME[U(WJIIJf(lJdli' where 
A N-l E[U(W;)IIJ = "2 [F (IJE[U(Wi(aJ)IIJ 
+ (1 - F(l;))N-1E[U(Wi(b;))IIJJ (15) 
+ [1- ~ (FN-1(lJ + (1- F(I;))N-l)]E[U(Wi(O))lIJ. 
The equilibrium number of dealers will be the greatest positive integer, N, 
such that the expected utility of those agents who choose to become dealers 
is at least as large as the expected utility of those agents who do not enter 
the market, or, equivalently, the greatest positive integer for which <p(N) is 
nonnegative, where 
<p(N) = i: E [U(W;) I IJf(l;) dli - e-RC i: E[U(Wi(O))IIJf(I;)dli · (16) 
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PROPOSITION 4: There exists an equilibrium number of dealers larger than one 
iff 4>(2) 2: o. If an equilibrium exists, it will be unique. Further, the equilib-
rium number of dealers is strictly increasing in both the size of the market 
order (Q) and the frequency of trades (A), and it is strictly decreasing in the 
cost of entry (C). 
The logic of the condition for existence is as follows. We first note that 
4>(N) is a strictly decreasing function: More dealers means fiercer competi-
tion and hence lower expected utility. If there were an infinite number of 
dealers, then they would set quotes equal to their reservation quotes result-
ing in zero profits when trading (see Proposition 1). Thus, 4>(N) goes to a 
negative number as N goes to infinity since becoming a dealer is unprofit-
able (they have to pay the cost of entry and they do not gain any profits). 
Therefore, 4>(2) 2: 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee the 
existence of a "nonmonopolist" equilibrium number of dealers. 
The comparative statics in Proposition 4 are quite intuitive. If the cost of 
entry increases, then entry becomes less attractive and, hence, the equilib-
rium number of dealers will decrease. In contrast, if the probability of trad-
ing increases (as reflected by an increase in A), entry becomes more attractive, 
since it is more likely to enjoy the surplus from trade. Similar arguments 
apply to changes in the size of the market order. 
Iv. The Market Order 
We will now determine the size of the public order in the two market 
structures by taking into account the solution to the trading stage derived in 
Section H. As for the benchmark case, we provide a welfare comparison be-
tween the two markets based on the solution to the public's problem. 
Doing a similar reasoning as in Lemma 1, the public has reservation buy-
ing (selling) prices, Pr (-L) (Pr (L)), given by 
Ru 2 
Pr(-L) = 1 - -2- (Q - 2L), and (17a) 
Ru 2 
Pr(L) = 1 + -2- (Q + 2L). (17b) 
Straightforward computations allow us to write the public's maximization 
problem when she is in a short position as follows: 
MaxE[ -e -RQ(Pr(-L)-AS)] , 
Q 
(18) 
where AS denotes the best ask quote in market structure S, S = C,F. 
Similarly, when the public is in a long position, her maximization problem 
becomes: 
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MaxE[ -e -RQ(BS-Pr(L))], 
Q 
where B S denotes now the best bid quote in market structure S. 
(19) 
Since the problem is symmetric, we will only determine the size of the 
public's purchase. Let us first note that Biais (1993) uses a Taylor expansion 
to get a linear approximation in equation (18). Thus, Biais' risk-neutral pub-
lic only cares about the expected surplus from trade. Further, in his setting, 
the per-unit expected surplus, E[Pr(-L) - AS], is equal in the two markets 
(recall that expected prices were equal). Consequently, the optimal market 
order will be the same in the two markets. More precisely, 
(20) 
We will now show that under risk aversion, the public behaves differently in 
the two markets. 
A. Fragmented Market 
The public, correctly, infers that AF = A(lN), and she chooses the size of 
her market order to maximize 
(21) 
B. Centralized Market 
The public now, correctly, infers thatAC = 1 + a~(lN-l)' Consequently, her 
maximization problem becomes 
MaxE [_eR2u2Q(Q-L-I/:'_1)]. (22) 
Q 
Denoting by QF (Qc) the public's optimal market order when she trades in 
a fragmented (centralized) market, the comparison between them gives rise 
to the following result. 
PROPOSITION 5: The optimal market order is larger in the fragmented market 
than in the centralized market. 
The proof of Proposition 5 gives, as a by-product, the following auxiliary 
result: 
(23) 
This tells us how the size of the market order changes as we move paramet-
rically from markets in which all traders (dealers and investors) are risk 
neutral to markets in which they are all risk averse. Under fragmentation, 
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risk aversion brings about two opposite effects: (a) a risk effect and (b) a 
price effect. The risk effect describes the idea that because the market order 
is an investment in a risky asset, a risk-averse individual (our public) will 
invest less than a risk-neutral individual (Biais' public). The price effect 
measures the favorable outcome for the investing public of the fiercer com-
petition brought on by the dealers' risk aversion.H The first inequality in 
(23) tells us that when markets are fragmented, the price effect dominates 
the risk effect, so that risk aversion increases the size of the market order. 
When markets are centralized, however, the price effect is absent and there 
is only a risk effect. Consequently, as the second inequality demonstrates, 
Biais'risk-neutral public invests more than our risk-averse public when they 
face the same prices. 
Proposition 5 shows that market liquidity, measured by spreads and vol-
ume, is greater in the less pretrade transparent market: Expected spreads 
are smaller and volume is higher. This result is consistent with the empir-
ical evidence reported in Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (1999). These au-
thors conclude that transparency may have detrimental effects on liquidity.12 
We now show that it has detrimental effects on welfare as well. 
PROPOSITION 6: All market participants strictly prefer to trade in fragmented 
markets, ceteris paribus. 13 
The arguments behind Proposition 6 are intuitive. Dealers prefer the mar-
ket with the largest volume of trade, as they are indifferent between the two 
markets for fixed Q (Proposition 2) and their expected utility is increasing in 
the size of the market order (Proposition 4). The public was already better 
off in fragmented markets for fixed Q (Proposition 3), hence, the optimality 
of QF only reinforces this preference. 
PROPOSITION 7: The equilibrium number of dealers will be larger when mar-
kets are fragmented. 
In Proposition 4, we showed that the equilibrium number of dealers is 
strictly increasing in Q. This result and Proposition 5 show our claim. Note 
that the public's preference for fragmentation is strengthened as, in equi-
librium, there will be more dealers trading in the fragmented markets. 
v. Discussion 
The model was based on a number of simplifying assumptions, and at this 
point, we are interested in assessing the impact of relaxing them in our 
conclusions. In this section, some alternative formulations are examined. 
11 Formally, the prices set by risk-averse dealers first-order stochastically dominate the prices 
set by risk-neutral dealers (see Corollary 1). 
12 They address pretrade transparency in the form of public display of limit order books 
using data from the Toronto Stock Exchange, before and after the limit order book was publicly 
disseminated on April 1990. 
13 This could be the case in countries where the number of liquidity suppliers is fixed by the 
regulation authority. 
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A. Private Information 
One extension of the model is to consider that the market order can come 
from one of two possible types of investors, either from a liquidity trader or 
from a perfectly informed trader. This extension can be analyzed using a 
simple model similar to the one proposed by Madhavan (1995) in which the 
risky asset can take on only two possible values, low and high.14 Let us first 
concentrate on the case in which the market order is determined exog-
enously. The liquidity trader buys or sells a fixed quantity, Q units of the 
asset, for exogenous liquidity reasons. The informed trader also buys or sells 
Q units of the asset. She wants to buy if she receives good news, and wants 
to sell otherwise. Thus, the direction of the market order now conveys some 
information about the final value of the asset. Consequently, dealers will 
take it into account for revising their beliefs. 
In this new model, the adverse selection induced by asymmetric informa-
tion causes the expected spreads to widen as dealers will protect themselves 
from information-based trading by setting worse prices. However, this effect 
is common to both markets and it does not hence reverse the ranking be-
tween them. Note that dealers update their beliefs identically in the two 
markets: They start with the same prior beliefs about the true value of the 
asset and they receive the same order size. 
Consider now that the public chooses her order optimally. If the informed 
trader's optimal order size were different from the one selected by the li-
quidity trader, then our previous results may not hold. However, this will 
not occur in equilibrium. Notice that an informed trader who acts as a li-
quidity trader can profit from her informational advantage, whereas if she 
does not camouflage, she cannot capitalize on her advantage. If order sizes 
were different, dealers would infer which market order comes from an in-
formed investor, and they would use this information to protect themselves 
by setting prices closer to the true value of the risky asset. This would re-
duce the informed investor's profits. 
B. Distribution of Inventories 
Throughout this paper, we assume that when dealers form their expecta-
tions of the distributions of underlying inventories, they use the same dis-
tribution, F(I), in the two markets. Clearly, this is not a realistic assumption 
if one uses a dynamic model where dealers' beliefs depend on the history of 
past trades, on the information flow, and on their own inventory position. 
Dealers will hence form conjectures regarding F(l) that are neither common 
among them, nor equal in the two markets. 
14 We will only mention here some results without stating either the specifics of the under-
lying model or the formal proofs. For a complete analysis of this extension, the reader is re-
ferred to our working paper (Frutos and Manzano (2000)). 
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To further illustrate the asymmetry in beliefs that a dynamic model gen-
erates, consider a two-period model in which dealers compete to get a pur-
chase market order in t = 1, and an unknown type of market order (purchase 
or sale) in t = 2. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that at t = 1 inventories 
are drawn from the same distribution, F(!), in the two markets. Consider 
first the beliefs at t = 2 of the dealers who did not trade in the first period. 
In a centralized market they will, at t = 2, know all the inventories except 
that of the dealer who did trade (their common belief will be that it lies in 
the interval [IN~l - Q,M - Q]). By contrast, a dealer with inventory I; who 
did not trade in a fragmented market will only know that there is a dealer 
whose inventory lies in the interval [I; - Q,M - Q]. Notice that these deal-
ers' beliefs are not common, as they depend on the inventory position. Con-
sider now the beliefs of the trading dealer. In the centralized market, he will 
know all the inventories, whereas in the fragmented market, he will only 
know that his competitors' inventories are smaller than his.15 
To the extent that there is more information flow in the centralized mar-
ket, it could be argued that F(!) has to be tighter in this market. We now 
explore how this fact could alter our results. We first note that if F were a 
degenerative distribution (equal inventories for all), then the two market 
designs would be fully equivalent, since there would be complete informa-
tion about inventories and, consequently, no risk. One should then expect 
smaller expected prices in the centralized market (as compared to the frag-
mented market) for a sufficiently tight F(!). We now show in an example 
that this is indeed the case. 
Let F(!) be a uniform distribution function with 1 E [-M,M]. Assume, for 
the sake of simplicity, that two dealers compete to get a market purchase of 
size one. Finally, let R = (J2 = 1. Straightforward computations yield 
3 1 
E[Ac(M)] = "2 + "3 M, and 
[ ( eI; + e~M)l E[AF(M)] = 1.5 - E In - I; + M . 
(24a) 
(24b) 
Figure 2 plots these functions. Notice that E[Ac(l)] = 1.83 < 1.85 = 
E[AF(2)]. Thus, a tighter distribution of inventories in a centralized market 
as compared to a fragmented market (I E [-1,1] versus 1 E [-2,2]) does 
result in smaller expected prices in the former market design. 
15 We do not know how our results might be altered in this richer model. Note that it is 
complex to study dynamic fragmented markets, as dealers' beliefs will not be symmetric. To get 
a hint on the difficulties, the reader is referred to Maskin and Riley (2000). 
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Figure 2. Expected ask prices for different ranges of inventories. The straight line per-
tains to the centralized market. 
C. Pretrade and Posttrade Transparency 
The Securities and Investment Board has suggested that the dissemina-
tion of quotes may, in a sense, substitute for posttrade information "by pro-
viding traders with sufficient information to make informed trading decisions" 
(Securities and Investment Board (1994), p. 8). Even though this role of 
quote transparency remains conjectural, it is interesting to note that our 
results for pretrade transparency are aligned with those obtained in the 
context of posttrade transparency. In particular, the result that expected 
spreads under fragmentation are narrower than under centralization is also 
derived in Madhavan (1995) and in Naik, Neuberger, and Viswanathan (1999). 
Since the former considers a setup closer to ours, let us now discuss this 
work in more detail. 
In Madhavan (1995), delayed reporting allows dealers to gauge the infor-
mation conveyed by a trade and exploit it later with other traders. This 
encourages dealers to offer better prices in less posttrade transparent mar-
kets. In other words, dealers profit from fragmentation because it results in 
less price competition: Nondisclosure allows them to participate in future 
trading to profit from the current acquired information. In contrast, in our 
framework, dealers offer better prices in fragmented markets because of 
risk aversion. Fragmentation results, in our setup, in more price competi-
tion. If we were to consider a dynamic model with two periods of trade (as in 
Madhavan), one could expect that spreads in the first period would be, un-
der fragmentation, narrower in the dynamic model than in the static one. 
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The intuition is that, at period one, dealers have two reasons to offer better 
prices: (a) risk aversion and (b) the possibility of exploiting the acquired 
information in subsequent trading. 
VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Securities markets worldwide have various degrees of public quote disclo-
sure with implications that are not well understood. We consider here the 
impact of quote visibility by analyzing fragmented and centralized markets: 
Two market structures which differ in the degree of quote dissemination. An 
interesting conclusion can be drawn from our analysis: The move toward 
greater transparency may have detrimental effects. The important upshot is 
that risk-averse dealers use less aggressive price strategies in the more trans-
parent market because quote dissemination alleviates uncertainty about the 
prices quoted by other dealers and, hence, reduces competition. 
There are, certainly, other countervailing forces that may offset the ad-
vantages of fragmented markets. In particular, we show in this paper that a 
sufficiently tight distribution of underlying inventories in a centralized mar-
ket, as compared to the distribution in a fragmented market, can result in 
smaller expected ask prices in the former than in the latter. Further, this 
seems a more realistic assumption than the one considered in this paper 
(equal distribution of underlying inventories) if one considers that there is 
repeated interaction between dealers. Another countervailing force could be 
endogenous informed traders' entry decisions. We have shown that an in-
vestor has more incentives to collect information (to own a private signal 
about the asset value) under fragmentation. The endogenous distribution of 
traders could then be different in the two markets with, more likely, a larger 
proportion of informed traders in fragmented markets. Adverse selection 
concerns could then widen the expected spread in the fragmented market. 
Which of the two effects (risk aversion or adverse selection) will dominate is 
unclear to us. 
Our results here may be contrasted with those of Flood et al. (1999) who 
also investigate quote transparency issues in an experimental study. They 
find that quote transparency reduces opening spreads and increases trading 
volume due to lower search costs. While their results conflict with ours, the 
differences in the setting can account for this. They consider quote-driven 
markets in which investors trade against outstanding prices set by risk-
neutral dealers. Further, interdealer trading is the bulk of the trading ac-
tivity. In contrast, we consider order-driven markets where investors submit 
orders first, and then dealers set prices.16 
Our research has a number of implications for regulatory policy. We find 
that increased pretrade transparency reduces dealers' need to compete for 
the order flow and, consequently, results in worse prices. This result sug-
gests that if price strategies depend on private information, then opaque-
16 Order-driven trading platforms include Instinet and AZX in Nasdaq. 
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ness of markets may be preferred as liquidity may be enhanced when markets 
are less transparent. If we combine our results with those showing that 
posttrade transparent markets are more informationally efficient, one could 
argue that the crucial issue in market design is the degree of transparency 
rather than its absolute attainment. It seems plausible to us that the com-
bination of less pretrade transparent microstructures with more posttrade 
transparent ones could improve the advantages of each separately. 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: See Ho and Stoll (1983) and/or Biais (1993). 
Proof of Proposition 1: Dealer i chooses ai to maximize ITa i(l - e -RQ(ai-ar,,»). 
His optimal ask fee is the solution to the following differ~ntial equation: 
where 
(A2) 
At a symmetric equilibrium, the differential equation becomes 
(A3) 
Multiplying by (daddIJe -Rar,iQ, it follows that 
(A4) 
Integrating and operating, we derive the optimal ask fee. In particular, 
(A5) 
Straightforward computations give the desired expression for ai' 
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We now analyze the derivative of a(·) with respect to I i • Using (A4) we 
obtain 
dFN-1(IJ 
dI, (e -RQar , _ e -RQa,) 
RQe-RQa'FN-l(IJ ' . (A6) 
Since the right-hand side of the previous equality is negative (recall that 
a i > a r ,;), it is deduced that the ask fee is strictly decreasing in the inven-
tory position. Let us now examine the derivative of ai with respect to N. This 
derivative, 
(A7) 
is negative as I < I i . Finally, ai ~ ar.i as N ~ 00, since for all I < I i , it is 
satisfied that (F(I)/F(Ii))N-l ~ 0 as N ~ 00. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Corollary 1: The expression for A(Iir) is derived from (A5) and 
Lemma 1. Using A (Iir) and AB (Iir), it is clear that A (Iir) < AB (Iir) if 
(AS) 
Similarly, B(In > BB(In if 
(A9) 
Both conditions are ensured by Jensen's inequality due to the convexity of 
the exponential function. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3: It is well known that second-degree stochastic mono-
tonic dominance can be characterized in the following way: 
x2:Y~Y=X+e, withE(elx)::::;O. (AlO) 
We now show that -AF 2: -Ac and BF 2: BC hold.17 
17 The negative sign in the best ask prices is due to the fact that they are buying prices from 
the public's perspective. 
21
Consider first the best ask price. Since -Ac = -AF - A C + AF, our claim 
will hold if E[-Ac + AFIAF] :::::: O. The properties of the conditional expecta-
tion imply 
(All) 
Since the public is a strictly risk-averse investor and a F is the certainty 
equivalent of a C, it must be the case that aF < E[acIAF ]. Consequently, 
(A12) 
Similar arguments apply for the bid price. Just notice that BC = BF + BC - BF 
and that E[BC - BFIBF] = E[l - bCIBF] - 1 + bF = bF - E[bcIBF] < 0, 
where the last inequality follows from the fact that bF is the certainty equiv-
alent of bC. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The equilibrium number of dealers is the greatest 
positive integer such that cfJ(N) is nonnegative. Straightforward computa-
tions using the expressions for the optimal quotes yield 
cfJ(N) = E[E[U(W;(O))ll;] 
(
-RC A(FN-l(l;) + (1- F(1;))N-l) A-Y(I;))] 
X 1-e - +--
22' 
(A13) 
where 
(A14) 
Integrating by parts the expressions in y(IJ, the function cfJ(N) can be re-
written as follows: 
cfJ(N) = (1 - e-Rc )E[E[U(W;(O))ll;]] 
- (AR2(J"2Q/2)E [E [U(Wi (0))11;]8(1;)], 
(A15) 
where the expression for 0(1;) is given by 
(A16) 
Notice that cf>(N) is continuous in N. Moreover, if we differentiate it, we 
obtain that 
(A17) 
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Both E[U(Wi(O»IIJ and aO(l;);aN are always negative. Hence, it follows 
that cfJ(N) is strictly decreasing in N. Further, cfJ(N) goes to [1 - e -RC] X 
E [U(Wi (0»], a negative number, as N goes to infinity. Thus cfJ(2) ;:::: 0 guar-
antees the existence of an equilibrium number of dealers larger than one. 
Finally, since cfJ(N) is strictly increasing in Q, it is deduced that the equi-
librium number of dealers increases as Q does. A similar argument applies 
to changes in A. In contrast, as C increases, cfJ(N) decreases and, hence, the 
equilibrium number of dealers decreases. Q.E.D. 
The proof of Proposition 5 relies on the following auxiliary result due to 
Kimball (1951). 
Kimball's inequality. Let U be a univariate random variable. If gl>'" ,gp 
are bounded, nonnegative and (strictly) monotone in the same direction, then 
(A18) 
COROLLARY: If gl,g2 are bounded, nonnegative, and such that gl is (strictly) 
monotone increasing and g2 is (strictly) monotone decreasing, then 
(A19) 
Proof of Corollary: Let feU) = C - g2(U), where C is a constant large 
enough such that f is nonnegative. This function is bounded and monotone 
increasing. Applying Kimball's inequality to the functions gl and f, we ob-
tain that 
E[gl(U)f(U)];:::: E[gl(U)]E[f(U)]. (A20) 
Substituting f in the last inequality and simplifying, the desired inequality 
is derived. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5: From the f.o.c. in the centralized market, it follows 
that 
(A21) 
or, equivalently, 
Using Kimball's inequality, we have that 
(A23) 
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Thus, 
(A24) 
The above inequality implies 
(A25) 
Similarly, from the f.o.c. in the fragmented market, it follows that 
(A26) 
or, equivalently, 
Let us denote by H to the second term in the left-hand side of (A27). Straight-
forward computations allow us to rewrite H as follows: 
The corollary to Kimball's inequality implies 
f:M eR2u2QFZ(M - Z) dH(Z) < iIM eR2u2QFZ dH(Z) f:M (M - Z) dH(Z). 
(A29) 
Therefore, 
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Let us now define three auxiliary functions. Let 
By using these auxiliary functions, we can rewrite (A30) as follows: 
The function g 3 (1) is bounded in the interval [-M, - M + E] (note that 
limI---+_Mg3(I) is equal to 2MeR2u2QFM). Hence, if K denotes an upper bound 
of g3(1), it is easy to see that 
The functions gl(I) and g2(I) are bounded and nonnegative in the interval 
[-M + E,M]. In addition, gl is monotone increasing and g2 is monotone 
decreasing. Consequently, appealing to the corollary to Kimball's inequality, 
we know that 
Hence, the combination of the two previous results gives 
H < K[FN(-M + E) - FN(-M)] + i:+c g2(I) dFN(I) i:+E gl(1) dFN(I). 
(A37) 
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As E goes to zero, the continuity of F and the definition of gl and of g2 yield 
Further, as F(·) is a cumulative distribution function, 
11 11 dFN-1(Z) (M - Z) dFN-1(Z) < (M - Z) = E(M - I* 1/) -M -M FN-1(l) N-l . (A39) 
Consequently, 
(A40) 
This inequality and (A38) imply 
(A41) 
Let us now get back to the f.o.c. for the fragmented market, that is, to Equa-
tion (A27). By replacing H by the left-hand side of the last inequality it 
follows that 
(A42) 
which implies QF > ~(L + E(/N- 1)). The combination of this inequality and 
(A25) shows the result. Q.E.D. 
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